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THE GLOBAL DILEMMA IN SHORT 
SELLING REGULATION: IOSCO’S 
INFORMATION DISCLOSURE PROPOSALS 
AND THE POTENTIAL FOR REGULATORY 
ARBITRAGE 
INTRODUCTION 
he tumultuous events leading up to the financial crisis in the fall of 
2008 resulted in the rapid enactment of global securities rules and 
regulations that were designed to limit, curb, or outright ban short selling 
activity. Undoubtedly, Credit Default Swaps1 played a critical role in 
corroding the global economy by providing insurance on risky mortgage 
bonds and encouraging reckless behavior during the housing bubble.2 
However, according to many regulatory authorities, short sellers greatly 
exacerbated global economic turmoil, driving some of the world’s largest 
financial institutions to the brink of ruin.3 Indeed, some industry experts 
debate that the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., (“Lehman 
Brothers”)—the largest in history—could have been avoided had Wall 
Street been restrained from “practicing one of its darkest arts.”4 The 
same experts have expressed concerns that certain short selling tech-
niques may amount to “gasoline on the fire” in distressed markets.5 
In order to respond to unprecedented deterioration of market stability 
and investor confidence in the financial sector, national regulatory au-
thorities imposed bans or additional restrictions on short selling with 
great haste and little or no notice.6 The resulting regulatory measures ex-
posed a general lack of consistency among national regulators concern-
ing the types of restrictions imposed on short selling as well as short po-
                                                                                                                                     
 1. A Credit Default Swap (“CDS”) is a contract, where the buyer pays a premium 
and the seller agrees to make a specific payment if a particular event, such as a bond de-
fault, occurs. Thus, if an investor is holding certain bonds and is concerned that the issuer 
will not be able to pay, purchasing CDSs should cover the potential loss. In this manner, 
CDS transfers credit risk among market participants. See Nicholas Varchaver & Katie 
Benner, The $55 Trillion Question, FORTUNE, Oct. 13, 2008, at 134. 
 2. See id. 
 3. Tom Lauricella, Lehman Legacy Alters Global Markets. Short-Sellers Took Flak 
as Stocks Fell, But Did Ban Help?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2009, at C1. 
 4. Gary Matsumoto, Naked Short Sales Hint Fraud in Bringing Down Lehman, 
BLOOMBERG.COM (Mar. 19, 2009), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20670001&sid=aB1jlqmFOTCA. 
 5. Id. (quoting U.S. Senator Ted Kaufman). 
 6. Kym Sheehan, Principled Regulatory Action? The Case of Short Selling 1 (Mar. 
12, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1368531. 
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sition disclosure requirements.7 In order to resolve this global regulatory 
disparity, the Task Force of the Technical Committee8 of the Internation-
al Organization of Securities Commission (“IOSCO” or the “organiza-
tion”)9 issued its Final Report on Regulation of Short Selling (“Short 
Selling Report”).10 The report identified the primary risks attributed to 
short selling and proposed four regulatory principles designed to limit 
those risks, while retaining certain market benefits associated with short 
selling activity.11 However, while IOSCO’s Short Selling Report aimed 
at providing a consistent global approach to short selling regulation in 
                                                                                                                                     
 7. See id. 
 8. IOSCO’s Technical Committee is a “specialized working group, made up of fif-
teen agencies that regulate some of the world’s larger, more developed and internationa-
lized markets.” Press Release, Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’ns, IOSCO Launches Task Force 
On Recent Market Events (Nov. 8, 2007), available at 
http://www.iasplus.com/iosco/0711subprime.pdf. Its objective is to review major regula-
tory issues related to international securities and futures transactions and to coordinate 
practical responses to these concerns. Id. Kathleen Casey, Commissioner, Securities and 
Exchange Commission, is the Chairman of the Technical Committee. Members of the 
Technical Committee, INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, 
http://www.iosco.org/lists/display_committees.cfm?cmtid=3 (last visited Oct. 16, 2009). 
Other members of the Technical Committee are regulatory agencies located in the Neth-
erlands, Australia, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Ontario, Quebec, 
Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. Id. The Technical Commit-
tee’s Task Force is generally comprised of the same agencies as the Technical Committee 
but is chaired by the Securities and Futures Committee, Hong Kong. See INT’L ORG. OF 
SEC. COMM’NS, CONSULTATION REPORT REGULATION OF SHORT SELLING (2009), availa-
ble at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD289.pdf [hereinafter SHORT 
SELLING REPORT]; IOSCO Committee Lists, INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS,  
http://www.iosco.org/lists/display_committees.cfm?cmtid=3 (last visited Oct. 16, 2009). 
 9. IOSCO is the International Organization of Securities Commissions comprised of 
member agencies that have resolved, through its permanent structures, “to cooperate 
together to promote high standards of regulation in order to maintain just, efficient and 
sound markets; to exchange information on their respective experiences in order to pro-
mote the development of domestic markets; to unite their efforts to establish standards 
and an effective surveillance of international securities transactions; to provide mutual 
assistance to promote the integrity of the markets by a rigorous application of the stan-
dards and by effective enforcement against offenses.” See About IOSCO, INT’L ORG. OF 
SEC. COMM’NS, http://www.iosco.org/about/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2009). The Objectives 
and Principles of Securities Regulation published by IOSCO in February of 2008 set out 
the three objectives of securities regulation: (1) the protection of investors, (2) ensuring 
that markets are fair, efficient and transparent, and (3) the reduction of systemic risk. See 
INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION at 
i (2008), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD154.pdf [he-
reinafter OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES REPORT]. 
 10. See SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 8. 
 11. Id. 
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the areas of compliance, enforcement, and disclosure obligations,12 the 
Short Selling Report did not offer a specific regulatory mechanism to 
achieve these goals.13 
This Note will suggest that IOSCO’s one-size-fits-all approach to short 
selling regulation ultimately fails to set forth meaningful regulatory stan-
dards that are applicable on an international basis. This Note will further 
intimate that the absence of such standards, especially with regard to 
consistent information disclosure obligations, may result in information 
asymmetry among jurisdictions, leaving the gate open for regulatory 
short selling arbitrage, which hinders market efficiency. Finally, this 
Note will conclude that IOSCO should address concerns arising from the 
dissonance in short selling disclosure regulations by implementing mea-
ningful and consistent disclosure and reporting standards. In this vein, 
IOSCO could follow the Committee of European Securities Regulators’ 
(“CESR”) approach14 in determining the most consistent regulatory dis-
closure requirements, which maximize the utility of short selling infor-
mation in the market. Such measures would undoubtedly promote the 
effectiveness of global short selling regulation and minimize the risk of 
regulatory arbitrage. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The objective of the Short Selling Report was to develop broad regula-
tory principles designed to assist domestic regulators in constructing a 
national short selling regulatory regime.15 The goal of IOSCO’s proposed 
principles was to enhance investor protection, market fairness, efficien-
cy, and transparency, and to reduce systemic risk.16 In this vein, the or-
ganization considered the nature of short selling, its risks and benefits, 
and its role in the global economy.17 IOSCO’s four principles of short 
selling regulation discussed in this Note reflect the organization’s view 
that while short selling plays an important role in the global markets, cer-
tain methods of short selling, such as naked short selling, pose serious 
economic risks and should be restrained.18 
                                                                                                                                     
 12. Id. at 4–5. 
 13. Id. 
 14. For a discussion of CESR approach, see infra Part III. 
 15. SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 8, at 4 (discussing the background and pur-
pose of IOSCO’s four principles of short selling regulation in the Executive Summary). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
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A. The Benefits and Risks of Short Selling in the Global Economy 
Although the precise legal definition of short selling varies according 
to jurisdiction, a transaction is generally defined as a short sale when it 
involves the sale of stock that the seller does not legally own at the time 
of the sale.19 Investors normally seek to make a profit from constantly 
fluctuating prices of securities that are traded on the markets.20 If inves-
tors believe that a company’s stock price will decline (e.g., due to the 
company’s announcement of lower than anticipated earnings), they will 
place themselves in a position to profit from this event by selling the 
company’s stock.21 However, if such investors do not own the compa-
ny’s stock at the relevant time, they may borrow22 the stock from other 
investors (or “lenders”), sell it in the market, and deliver it to the buyer.23 
If the short seller is correct in thinking that the stock’s price will decline, 
he or she will purchase the stock at the lower price and return it to the 
lender, thereby making a profit.24 
The utility of short selling has historically been a subject of debate be-
tween those who espouse the ability of short selling to increase market 
transparency25 and critics, who highlight its propensity to destabilize se-
                                                                                                                                     
 19. IOSCO’s Technical Committee accumulated certain short selling features com-
mon to most jurisdictions into a ‘bucketed’ definition. A particular transaction is defined 
as a falling within the ‘realm of short selling’ if it consists of the following two factors: 
(1) a sale of stock and (2) that the seller does not own at the point of sale. SHORT SELLING 
REPORT, supra note 8 at 24; see also Piero Cinquegrana, Short Selling: A Known Un-
known (European Capital Mkts. Inst., ECMI Commentary No. 23/29, 2009), available at 
http://www.ceps.eu/node/1671. 
 20. ELIOT NORTON, ON “SHORT SALES” OF SECURITIES THROUGH A STOCKBROKER 5–6 
(1907). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Shares are often borrowed from a long-term share owner, such as an insurance 
fund or a pension fund, and the owner will receive lending fees from the borrower. See 
FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, SHORT SELLING, DISCUSSION PAPER, 2009, 09/1, at 6, 
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dp09_01.pdf [hereinafter FSA SHORT 
SELLING PAPER]. 
 23. Id. 
 24. In other words, the classic theory for short selling rests upon the premise that an 
investor believes that negative information concerning an issuer (such as lower earnings, 
major litigation, or a downturn in the sector) will lead to a decline in the price of its pub-
licly-traded securities. Based on this belief, the investor will sell the stock at the current 
price, deliver the borrowed shares to the buyer, and repurchase those shares later in the 
market when the share price will purportedly be lower based on the investor’s theory. 
NORTON, supra note 20, at 5; Sheehan, supra note 6. 
 25. Transparency may be defined as the degree to which information about trading is 
made publicly-available on a real-time basis. OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES REPORT, supra 
note 9, at 6. 
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curity prices during stressful market periods.26 Proponent economists 
consider short selling to be instrumental in “unearthing overvalued com-
panies and contributing to efficient stock prices.”27 For instance, some 
market analysts believe that without the ability to short sell, stock prices 
would rise and become overvalued, shutting relevant negative informa-
tion out of the market.28 In this manner, short selling contributes to the 
price discovery of a particular security.29 Certain empirical evidence also 
highlights that short sellers tend to be the better informed market partici-
pants and when short sellers are shut out of the market, stocks tend to be 
more expensive and generate abnormally low future returns.30 In sum, 
the benefits incurred by the market from nonabusive short selling activity 
include correcting overpriced stock, facilitating hedging and risk man-
agement techniques,31 and providing liquidity32 to the markets.33 
Conversely, critics of short selling consider it to be a largely specula-
tive and high risk activity.34 A short seller has the potential to incur es-
sentially unlimited losses if the price of the security continuously rises 
                                                                                                                                     
 26. Id. 
 27. The benefits of short selling are also evidenced by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s repeal of the uptick rule and other price tests in 2007 in order to “simpli-
fy” short sale regulation. See SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 8, at 25. See generally 
Ekkehart Boehmer, Charles M. Jones & Xiaoyan Zhang, Shackling Short Sellers: The 
2008 Shorting Ban (Johnson Sch., Research Paper Series No. 34-09, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1412844. 
 28. Boehmer, Jones & Zhang, supra note 27, at 2. 
 29. Price discovery could be described as a method of determining the price of a spe-
cific security through basic supply and demand factors related to the market. Investope-
dia, Price Discovery, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/pricediscovery.asp (last vi-
sited Jan. 28, 2010). 
 30. Boehmer, Jones & Zhang, supra note 27, at 3. 
 31. For example, curtailing the risk of a long position in stock or call options via es-
tablishing a short position in the stock. See id. 
 32. Liquidity may be defined as “being readily convertible to cash.” With respect to 
securities, a stock is considered liquid when there are enough shares trading in the market 
so that large transactions can occur without substantial price variations. BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004); see also Lauricella, supra note 3. 
 33. See Boehmer, Jones & Zhang, supra note 27. 
 34. THE COMMITTEE OF EUROPEAN SECURITIES REGULATORS (“CESR”), MEASURES 
ADOPTED BY CESR MEMBERS ON SHORT SELLING, CESR/08–742 (2009) (emphasizing 
that unregulated short selling may increase market risk) [hereinafter CESR SHORT 
SELLING MEASURES]. CESR is an independent Committee of European Securities Regula-
tors. See CESR in Short, http://www.cesr-
eu.org/index.php?page=cesrinshort&mac=0&id= (last visited Dec. 10, 2009). CESR’s 
mission is to improve coordination among securities regulators, act as an advisory group 
to assist the EU Commission and work to ensure more consistent and timely day-to-day 
implementation of community legislation in the Member States. Id. 
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rather than falls.35 Furthermore, market authorities stipulate that unregu-
lated short selling may lead to more serious and damaging consequences 
such as creation of disorderly markets, settlement disruptions, and mar-
ket abuse.36 In fact, many commentators have blamed short sellers for 
past stock market declines and crashes—from the financial troubles of 
the East India Company in 1609, to the stock market crash of 1929, to 
the 2008 global financial crisis.37 Thus, most market authorities attempt 
to regulate short selling with an objective of retaining the benefits, while 
mitigating the risks.38 
In the Short Selling Report, IOSCO classified the risks inherent in un-
regulated short selling activity into three categories of regulatory and 
market risk, which are common to most jurisdictions.39 The first category 
concerns the accelerant-like effect of short selling on an issuer that 
creates a spiraling downward pressure on the share prices of stock. Es-
sentially, the speed and weight of aggressive short selling may cause 
market disorder when investors do not have enough time to respond to 
the increasing downward pressure on the stock. 40 This activity may 
cause potential buyers to withhold from purchasing the security and en-
courage holders of the security to sell it.41 If the price of the stock de-
creases exponentially, the issuer will have difficulty borrowing money 
and attracting investors, such that it cannot improve its financial condi-
tion before its stock becomes worthless.42 When the issuer is a bank, ag-
                                                                                                                                     
 35. INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, REPORT ON TRANSPARENCY OF SHORT SELLING 7 
(2003), available at http:// www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD147.pdf [herei-
nafter TRANSPARENCY REPORT]. 
 36. Amendments to Regulation SHO, Exchange Act Release No. 34–60388, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 61,706 at 5–7, 8 (Oct. 14, 2008); see also CESR SHORT SELLING MEASURES, supra 
note 34. 
 37. INT’L SEC. LENDING ASS’N, SECURITIES LENDING AND SHORT SELLING (2009), 
available at 
http://www.isla.co.uk/uploadedFiles/Member_Area/General_Library/SECURITIES%20L
ENDING%20AND%20SHORT%20SELLING%20(3).pdf (“The International Securities 
Lending Association (ISLA) is a trade association established in 1989 to represent the 
common interests of participants in the securities lending industry. ISLA has more than 
100 members comprising insurance companies, pension funds, asset managers, banks and 
securities dealers representing more than 4,000 clients. Whilst based in London, ISLA 
represents members from more than twenty countries in Europe, the Middle East, Africa 
and North America.”) [hereinafter SECURITIES LENDING AND SHORT SELLING]. 
 38. See, e.g., Boehmer, Jones & Zhang, supra note 27. 
 39. See generally Amendments to Regulation SHO, supra note 36; FSA SHORT 
SELLING, supra note 22; SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 8. 
 40. SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 8, at 7, 22. 
 41. FSA SHORT SELLING PAPER, supra note 22, at 12. 
 42. Id. at 11–14. 
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gressive short selling of the bank’s shares may also lead to depositor 
run.43 In this sense, normal fluctuations of stock prices are exacerbated 
by aggressive short selling, which has the potential to lead the issuer into 
bankruptcy even though it may be otherwise well-capitalized.44 There-
fore, the activity of aggressive short selling may itself be disorderly, in 
addition to the fact that the outcome of such activity may lead to undesir-
able consequences.45 
The second regulatory concern identified by IOSCO is the potential for 
abusive market behavior.46 Abusive market behavior is apparent when 
short selling, accompanied by false rumors designed to encourage others 
to sell, drives down the price of the security and triggers a large profit at 
the expense of the issuer whose security is being oversold.47 The regula-
tory concern highlighted in this instance is that short selling may provide 
a valuable tool for those who intend to abuse the market.48 Regulators 
often define market abuse or market manipulation as an illegal “inten-
tional interference with the free forces of supply and demand.”49 Al-
though the definition of manipulative activity varies slightly among ju-
risdictions, most regulatory authorities recognize that when a market par-
ticipant spreads false rumors designed to encourage others to sell, and he 
or she sells the security in question, such activity is a “clear case of ab-
usive behavior.”50 
                                                                                                                                     
 43. A depositor run or “bank run” takes place when the customers of a bank fear that 
the bank will become insolvent. Customers rush to the bank to take out their money as 
quickly as possible to avoid losing it. In this situation, short selling may become a rapid 
self-fulfilling prophesy resulting in the potential collapse of issuers that are targeted by 
the short sellers. About.com: Economics, Bank Run—Dictionary Definition of Bank Run, 
http://economics.about.com/cs/economicsglossary/g/bank_run.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 
2010); see also FSA SHORT SELLING PAPER, supra note 22, at 12. 
 44. TRANSPARENCY REPORT, supra note 35, at 22. 
 45. See SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 8. 
 46. Id at 22. 
 47. Id. 
 48. SECURITIES LENDING AND SHORT SELLING, supra note 37, at 4 (explaining that 
propensity to abuse the market may arise from any other form of trading, so the regulato-
ry concern in this instance is not that short selling is an abusive strategy in itself). 
 49. John D. Finnerty, Short Selling, Death Spiral Convertibles, and the Profitability 
of Stock Manipulation 2–4 (Mar. 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=687282 (explaining that manipulative 
trading strategies—such as releasing false information about a company into the market, 
naked short selling and employing trading strategies that impede the price formation 
process—corrupt the market’s price formation process, and inject misleading information 
into the market to move stock prices in the direction that benefits the manipulator. It is 
important to note that market manipulation can be profitable when there is a difference 
between the price elasticity of purchases and sales that the manipulator can exploit). 
 50. SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 8, at 22. 
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For example, some market authorities blamed abusive short selling for 
exacerbating the circumstances which eventually led to the collapse of 
Bear Stearns & Co., Inc. (“Bear Stearns”) and Lehman Brothers.51 Ac-
cording to the Financial Services Authority (“FSA”), market conditions 
in the fall of 2008 led to an unacceptably high risk of abusive behavior, 
precipitated by false rumors and aggressive short selling, which created 
self-fulfilling prophesies with respect to the collapse of already vulnera-
ble issuers (such as Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers).52 In a similar 
manner, some market analysts contend that American International 
Group, Inc. (“AIG”) may have averted the need for government financial 
assistance had its stock price not been driven down by short sellers, the-
reby triggering a credit downgrade, which then required the company to 
raise $14 billion in capital overnight in order to meet collateral require-
ments on its credit default swaps.53 
The third regulatory concern identified by IOSCO regarding short sell-
ing is the potential for settlement54 disruption, which causes difficulties 
for the purchasers of the security.55 Settlement disruption56 may arise in 
the context of “naked” short selling, where the short seller has not bor-
rowed or arranged to borrow the securities ahead of the sale.57 As a re-
sult, the seller fails to deliver securities to the buyer when delivery is 
due.58 Naked short selling may increase the potential for market abuse by 
                                                                                                                                     
 51. Bill Saporito, Are Short Sellers to Blame for the Financial Crisis?, TIME, Sept. 
18, 2008, http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1842499,00.html. 
 52. FSA SHORT SELLING PAPER, supra note 22. 
 53. Saporito, supra note 51. 
 54. “Settlement” is the date on which payment is made for a trade. For stocks traded 
on US exchanges, settlement is currently three business days after the trade. In some 
regional markets, foreign shares may require months to settle. Id; see also Bloomberg 
Financial Glossary, http://www.bloomberg.com/invest/glossary/bfgloss.htm (last visited 
Oct. 19, 2009). 
 55. See Saporito, supra note 51. 
 56. Settlement disruption is a situation where one party pays for the shares he or she 
purchased and the counterparty (i.e., the short seller) does not deliver the shares (and 
vice-versa). See SECURITIES LENDING AND SHORT SELLING, supra note 37. Short selling 
carries with it a certain level of “settlement risk.” Id. Settlement risk, sometimes called 
“Herstatt risk,” was “named after the well-known failure of the German bank Herstatt 
whose license was withdrawn by regulators on June 26 1974 due to its inability to cover 
its liabilities. This forced the bank into liquidation and it ceased operating.” Reuters Fi-
nancial Glossary, http://glossary.reuters.com/index.php?title=Herstatt_Risk&redirect=no 
(last visited Oct. 16, 2009).. When German banking regulators closed the bank down, 
counter parties were left with substantial losses. Id. 
 57. Amendments to Regulation SHO, supra note 36, at 5. 
 58. This is also known as “failure to deliver” or “fail.” See SEC, Naked Short Sales, 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/nakedshortsale.htm (last visited Dec. 12, 2009). 
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manipulating the price of a particular security.59 Price manipulation oc-
curs when the naked short seller creates an overall imbalance in the 
supply and demand in the securities markets, thereby influencing the 
price of the targeted issuer’s stock.60 Without the stock borrowing re-
quirement, a short sale effectively increases the supply of a targeted issu-
er’s stock, which, in turn, decreases the stock’s price.61 The theory is that 
the artificial increase in a company’s outstanding stock62 essentially de-
values it,63 and the failure to deliver the shares is tantamount to issuing 
new stock without the company’s permission.64 The Securities and Ex-
change Commission (“SEC”) has recognized that short sellers may inten-
tionally fail to deliver securities as part of a scheme to manipulate (i.e., 
artificially decrease) their price. The injection into the market of mislead-
ing information concerning the supply and the price of an issuer’s stock 
causes unwarranted reputational damage to the issuer and undermines 
investor confidence in the issuer’s financial stability.65 In addition, un-
timely delivery may hinder the purchaser’s ability to meet obligations 
with respect to an onward series of transactions.66 
Naked short selling also gives rise to potential corporate governance 
issues.67 For example, when naked short selling leads to settlement fail-
ure, shareholders are deprived of their stock ownership benefits, such as 
                                                                                                                                     
 59. SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 8, at 23. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See FSA SHORT SELLING PAPER, supra note 22; Boehmer, Jones & Zhang, supra 
note 27. 
 62. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 108 (9th ed. 2007) (explaining that outstanding stock, also known 
as issued stock, is stock that has been authorized to be issued by the company in its certif-
icate of incorporation). 
 63. For example, the same thing happens to a currency when a government prints 
more of it. Lauricella, supra note 3 at 2 (quoting Susanne Trimbath, a trade-settlement 
expert and president of STP Advisory Services). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Amendments to Regulation SHO, supra note 36, at 5–8 (For example, in Rhino 
Advisors, Inc. and Thomas Badian, Lit. Rel. No. 18003 (Feb. 27, 2003), the SEC alleged 
that the defendants profited from “engaging in massive naked short selling that flooded 
the market with the [issuer’s] stock and depressed its price”); FSA SHORT SELLING 
PAPER, supra note 23 at 11; Brooke Masters, Crackdown on ‘Naked Short-Selling Intensi-
fies, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2009, at C2. 
 66. SHORT SELLING REPORT supra note 8, at 23 (explaining that disruption of timely 
settlement of shares also contributes to wider systemic risk); see also Amendments to 
Regulation SHO, supra note 36, at 6 (“large and persistent fails to deliver may deprive 
shareholders of the benefits of ownership such as voting and lending.” In addition, the 
seller avoids incurring the costs normally required to borrow the security.). 
 67. Finnerty, supra note 49, at 6 n.9 (explaining the corporate governance issue). 
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voting.68 This is because the buyer of so-called “phantom shares” created 
by the naked short seller believes that they are real shares and therefore 
hold voting rights. Consequently, “if brokers send the proxy materials to 
owners of phantom shares who then vote for them, there could be more 
votes cast for the directors than actually exist.” 
The impact of settlement disruption is illustrated in the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers. Because of the lack of controls applicable to short sell-
ing, “as many as 32.8 million shares in Lehman Brothers were sold and 
not delivered to buyers on time as of Sept. 11[, 2008], according to data 
compiled by the Securities and Exchange Commission and Bloomberg.” 
69 Many industry professionals believed that the naked short selling of 
Lehman Brothers stock, coupled with the alleged spread of false rumors 
designed to encourage others to sell the stock, may have been largely 
responsible for the firm’s demise. 70 In a similar case, stock delivery fail-
ures increased for Bear Stearns as well, peaking the day after it was an-
nounced that JPMorgan Chase & Co. would acquire the company for two 
dollars per share.71 Although both Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns 
were experiencing grave financial problems during 2008, the theory was 
that short sellers were exacerbating the situation by driving their stock 
prices lower than they should have been with such speed that recovery 
was virtually impossible.72 
Without regulatory constraints, naked short selling may threaten the 
stability of broader markets and create “systemic risk.”73 Systemic risk 
has been broadly defined as the potential breakdown in an entire system, 
where “an event will trigger a loss of economic value or confidence . . . 
in a substantial portion of the financial system that is serious enough to . . 
. have significant adverse effects on the real economy.”74 In this scenario, 
the magnitude and/or speed of short selling are not constrained by the 
short seller’s ability to borrow the stock in the market before executing 
the sale.75 This trading technique generally increases the manipulator’s 
                                                                                                                                     
 68. SECURITIES LENDING AND SHORT SELLING, supra note 37, at 4. 
 69. Matsumoto, supra note 4. 
 70. Id. at 1 (quoting Richard Fuld, former Chief Executive Officer of Lehman Broth-
ers). 
 71. Id. 
 72. See, e.g., Posting of Alex Singleton to Telegraph, Short Selling Helped Promote 
Truth About HBOS and Lehman Brothers, http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk (Sept. 18, 2008). 
 73. See FSA SHORT SELLING PAPER, supra note 22. 
 74. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., G10 REPORT ON CONSOLIDATION IN 
THE FINANCIAL SECTOR (2001), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/60/0,3343,end_2649_34593_1895868_1_1_1_1,00.html 
[hereinafter G10 REPORT]. 
 75. FSA SHORT SELLING PAPER, supra note 22, at 11; see also id. 
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profit and aggravates price decline of the underlying stock.76 In this 
sense, naked short selling can be especially damaging to an issuer’s stock 
price because “ignoring the regulatory requirement to borrow the shares 
eliminates the main quantitative constraint on the amount of short selling 
and intensifies the resulting downward pressure on price.”77 Significant 
price declines in the stock of issuers that has been subject to extensive 
naked short selling can create a crisis in investor confidence without a 
fundamental underlying reason. In the financial world, contagious loss of 
investor confidence in the market creates a high probability of systemic 
breakdown.78 Once a financial event has become systemic, economic 
effects may include bank runs, failures of illiquid but solvent firms, and 
reductions in the supply of funds to finance profitable investment oppor-
tunities.79 
B. Regulatory Restraints on Short Selling 
Due to the risks posed by unregulated short selling, regulatory authori-
ties in countries with the most active global capital markets have main-
tained some forms of restrictive measures controlling naked short selling 
activities. 80 The events leading up to the bankruptcies of Bear Stearns 
and Lehman Brothers led regulators worldwide to conclude that short 
selling was used in an abusive manner, creating widespread investor pan-
ic and destabilizing the markets.81 As part of its response to the ensuing 
market instability, the SEC, for example, issued a temporary order re-
stricting short selling in the shares of 19 financial firms deemed systemi-
                                                                                                                                     
 76. Finnerty, supra 49, at 5–6, 33. 
 77. At the extreme, short position in a stock may even exceed a firm’s entire supply 
of outstanding shares. Id. at 33. 
 78. See G10 REPORT, supra note 74. 
 79. See id. (explaining that most systemic crises that have occurred in G10 and other 
countries in the past 50 years have exhibited at least one of the defining characteristics of 
systemic risk). 
 80. Cinquegrana, supra note 19, at 10–14 (explaining that although “different juris-
dictions use the term ‘naked’ in slightly different ways, the common regulatory concern . 
. . is that a seller does not own the stock he is selling and has made no provision to bor-
row or provide for delivery of stock to the purchaser by the settlement date”); see, e.g.,  
Amendments to Regulation SHO, supra note 36 (where the SEC has made permanent a 
temporary rule that was approved in 2008 in response to continuing concerns regarding 
“fails to deliver” and potentially abusive “naked” short selling. In particular, temporary 
Rule 204T makes it a violation of Regulation SHO and imposes penalties if a market 
participant does not purchase or borrow shares to close—out a “fail to deliver” resulting 
from a short sale in any equity security. . . . Moreover, Regulation SHO reflects the 
SEC’s concern that “pervious restrictions on short selling had not been effective in pre-
venting its use as manipulative device). 
 81. See Matsumoto, supra note 4; see also FSA SHORT SELLING PAPER, supra note 22. 
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cally important, by reinforcing the penalties for failing to deliver the 
shares on time.82 In September 2008, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission temporarily banned short selling in 799 stocks, while the FSA 
instituted its own short selling ban on 29 leading financial stocks.83 
When the financial crisis of 2008 reached international markets, global 
regulatory agencies took emergency actions to further restrain, or out-
right prohibit short selling activities. The regulatory efforts included out-
right jurisdiction-wide bans on short selling, partial bans on certain types 
of short selling activities, and the institution of short position disclosure 
and reporting requirements in view of the permitted short selling activi-
ties.84 
However, the regulatory measures implemented by global market au-
thorities in order to restrain potentially abusive short selling were largely 
dissimilar across jurisdictions.85 Regulatory judgments of what consti-
tuted abusive short selling varied according to jurisdiction. In addition, 
domestic regulatory efforts were largely uncoordinated with respect to 
the types of restrictions imposed on short selling and short position dis-
closure requirements.86 For example, after the SEC banned short selling 
for 799 stocks in September 2008, Taiwan, Netherlands, and France 
enacted outright country-wide bans of all short selling activities.87 Full 
bans on short selling were eventually lifted in all jurisdictions with de-
veloped capital markets. Consequently, many national regulators en-
hanced certain disclosure-based controls over short selling.88 
                                                                                                                                     
 82. Searching for the Naked Truth (Aug. 2008), ECONOMIST, available at 
http://www.economist.com/finance/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=11951246. 
 83. Cinquegrana, supra note 19, at 5. 
 84. Sheehan, supra note 6, at 1–2. 
 85. TRANSPARENCY REPORT, supra note 35. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Australia suspended covered short selling on all stocks. Cinquegrana supra note 
19, at 5. Canadian regulatory authority also banned the short selling of all financial 
stocks. Id. 
 88. IOSCO’s Technical Committee recognized the concern stemming from unregu-
lated short-selling activities: 
The Technical Committee believes that short selling plays an important role in 
the market for a variety of reasons, such as providing more efficient price dis-
covery, mitigating market bubbles, increasing market liquidity, facilitating 
hedging and other risk management activities. However, there is also a general 
concern that especially in extreme market conditions, certain types of short sell-
ing, or the use of short selling in combination with certain abusive strategies, 
may contribute to disorderly markets. 
SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 8, at 4 (quoting the Executive Summary of the Re-
port); see also TRANSPARENCY REPORT, supra note 35. 
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The implementation of short position disclosure requirements reflects 
the theory that short position disclosure generally provides valuable in-
formation to the market 89 and informed markets are less prone to mani-
pulation and disorder.90 Valuable information related to short selling ac-
tivity, if widely available, could enhance market transparency, which is 
one of the theoretical conditions required for the free markets to function 
efficiently.91 Essentially, well-informed markets exhibit less information 
asymmetry and present less opportunity for arbitrageurs to profit at the 
expense of uninformed market participants. Sufficient disclosure can also 
remove the opportunity for market manipulators to spread false rumors 
designed to influence trading activity, and can thereby deter market ma-
nipulation.92 However, when regulatory disclosure requirements differ 
among jurisdictions,93 the timeliness and availability of information in 
those jurisdictions are affected. As a consequence, regulatory efforts 
aimed at curbing market manipulation may be undermined if manipula-
tors take advantage of information asymmetry among different jurisdic-
tions. 
C. The Risks Information Asymmetry and the Potential for Regulatory 
Arbitrage 
Conventional financial theory suggests that market efficiency stems 
from informational efficiency. For example, a market may be more effi-
cient when security prices reflect more information useful to investors 
within shorter periods of time.94 Information asymmetry can occur when 
one market participant has more or better information than another mar-
ket participant. 95 This creates an imbalance of power in transactions, 
giving rise to potentially large discrepancies between buy and sell orders 
when better-informed participants exploit their informational advan-
tage.96 
                                                                                                                                     
 89. See TRANSPARENCY REPORT, supra note 35. 
 90. Id. 
 91. A market is said to be transparent if information is available with regard to the 
relevant assets and prices trading on the market. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. For example, in some jurisdictions disclosure involves publishing cumulative 
short sales volumes in individual securities on a daily basis, while in others it involves 
periodic publication of the overall short position in individual securities as measured at 
specific moment. See id. at 14, 21. 
 94. Amir N Licht, Regulatory Arbitrage for Real: International Securities Regulation 
in a World of Interacting Securities Markets, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 563, 564, 567 (1998). 
 95. See Stephen Brown & Stephen A. Hillegeist, How Disclosure Quality Affects the 
Level of Information Asymmetry, 12 REV. ACCT. STUD. 443 (2007). 
 96. See id. 
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Some studies suggest that over a long time horizon, there is a negative 
association between disclosure quality and information asymmetry.97 
Analogously, higher quality of information disclosure may contribute to 
the balancing of power among the buyers and sellers in the market, or 
decrease the average level of asymmetry among investors. This pheno-
menon can be applied to regulatory short position disclosure require-
ments.98 Any market efficiencies created by short selling have the poten-
tial of being offset by the information asymmetry with regard to other 
market participants who are unaware of the short sales.99 This may be 
especially true in developed capital markets, where the prices of public-
ly-traded securities reflect a “mechanism for communicating informa-
tion.”100 Thus, failing to disclose the amount of short interest in a stock 
may remove certain negative information about the issuer from the mar-
ket, rendering the market less efficient. It is important to note, however, 
that disclosure quality and effectiveness ultimately depends on the 
amount, timeliness, and precision of the disclosed information.101 
Even though disclosure-based short selling regulations exist in many 
jurisdictions, these regulations vary with respect to the scope of the dis-
closures and short position reporting requirements. Divergent disclosure 
regulations also give rise to regulatory compliance issues for companies 
that operate internationally.102 These companies are operationally and 
financially burdened by having to comply with a multiplicity of different 
regimes.103 Arguably, the greater concern is a threat to market efficiency, 
where different short position disclosure requirements among jurisdic-
tions may lead to information asymmetry and open the gate for regulato-
ry arbitrage. 
Regulatory conflicts may develop when some jurisdictions take the 
view that the market is benefitted by rigorous short position disclosures, 
while other jurisdictions deem such disclosure requirements to be ineffi-
cient or prefer different disclosure approaches. The ensuing divergence 
in regulatory regimes may give rise to regulatory arbitrage, which indi-
cates a migration trend toward the more lenient regulatory regimes, and 
is often associated with a “race to the bottom” argument.104 The race to 
                                                                                                                                     
 97. See id. (referencing studies of information asymmetry and disclosures). 
 98. Empirical studies suggest that this will occur over a long time period. Id. 
 99. SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 8, at 14. 
 100. Licht, supra note 94, at 609 (citing F. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 
35 AM. ECON. REV. 527 (1945)). 
 101. Brown and Hillegeist, supra note 95, at 26. 
 102. FSA SHORT SELLING PAPER, supra note 22, at 23. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See Licht, supra note 94. 
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the bottom argument recognizes that when two jurisdictions with differ-
ent regulatory regimes are pitted against each other, market participants 
will find a way to adopt whatever regulatory framework they feel is 
best.105 When competing regulatory regimes simultaneously interact with 
one another, certain externalities are exerted on those subject to a par-
ticular regime.106 One such externality is the erosion of regulatory effect 
on market participants.107 This may develop when companies have mul-
tiple stock listings and international operations. 108 For example, if one 
jurisdiction implements stringent exchange-listing rules for the purpose 
of curbing certain activity, a company may avoid the more stringent rules 
by listing its stock in a different jurisdiction with less demanding listing 
standards.109 
Similarly, with respect to information disclosure obligations, when a 
stock trades on multiple markets with varying regulatory disclosure re-
gimes, arbitrageurs may use trading information obtained from one juris-
diction, which is untimely or unavailable in another jurisdiction, in order 
to profit at the expense of uninformed market participants. In this regula-
tory arbitrage scenario, the economic “law of one price” theory is signifi-
cantly shattered.110 This theory holds that “if an identical commodity or 
asset sells in two different markets, then the price of this item should be 
the same barring transaction costs.”111 “Departure from [this theory] may 
lead to arbitrage profits, generated from buying the underpriced security 
or selling the overpriced security.”112 In this manner, arbitrageurs may 
profit when information obtained from one market indicates that the 
same security is overpriced in another market because the latter does not 
reflect certain relevant negative information, such as the level of short 
interest in the security. After acquiring the necessary negative informa-
tion about the security in the more informed market, the arbitrageur will 
sell what he believes to be an overpriced security in the less informed 
market, thereby profiting from the divergence of regulatory disclosure 
regimes. Therefore, regulatory arbitrage may occur as a consequence of 
                                                                                                                                     
 105. Roberta S. Karmel & Claire R. Kelly, The Hardening of Soft Law in Securities 
Regulation, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L. L. 883, 885–886 (2009); Licht, supra note 94, at 633. 
 106. Licht, supra note 94, at 633. 
 107. Id. at 630–33. 
 108. Id. at 630 
 109. Id. 
 110. See id. at 590. 
 111. Id. (quoting Kiyoshi Kato et al., Are There Arbitrage Opportunities in the Market 
for American Depository Receipts?, 1 J. INT’L FIN. MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & MONEY 73 
(1991)). 
 112. Id. 
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different disclosure regimes when some market participants profit finan-
cially from the less informed markets.113 
In addition, different short position disclosure requirements may con-
tribute to the free-rider problem.114 In this scenario, a market that cap-
tures valuable information through disclosure requirements will invite 
free-rider markets, which do not implement rigorous disclosure obliga-
tions.115 Essentially, free-riders wind up utilizing the information ob-
tained from more informed markets without incurring the costs of gene-
rating that information.116 Another externality of different short position 
disclosure requirements is the fact that markets with less rigorous disclo-
sure regimes resort to “chasing” the information.117 Consequently, when 
relevant information is conveyed to the free-rider market at a time lag, 
arbitrageurs are presented with the opportunity to take advantage of the 
less informed markets. 
D. IOSCO’s Role in Implementing Internationally-Consistent Short 
Selling Regulatory Principles 
As presented above, discerning the consequences of the interactions of 
different regulatory regimes is essential when international regulatory 
initiatives are considered by such organizations as IOSCO.118 The organ-
ization’s members cooperate to propose internationally-consistent regula-
tory guidelines via published reports or consultation papers.119 IOSCO’s 
publications set forth proposed legal or regulatory principles, which are 
not automatically codified into binding international or domestic law.120 
When the proposed guidelines are accepted and implemented by the in-
ternational community and domestic securities regulators, IOSCO prin-
ciples often evolve into “soft law,” which represents “non-binding stan-
dards and principles of conduct.”121 
As a voluntary international standard-setting body, IOSCO’s soft law 
is developed largely through its consultation papers and reports (such as 
                                                                                                                                     
 113. Id. at 567. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 566–67. 
 116. Id at 566. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 567. 
 119. Press Release, Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’ns, IOSCO Launches Task Force On 
Recent Market Events, supra note 8. 
 120. Karmel & Kelly, supra note 105, at 883–86. 
 121. Id. at 884, 885 (explaining that while IOSCO’s members pledge to implement the 
Organization’s standards domestically, the standards do not have the force of either inter-
national or domestic law). 
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the Short Selling Report), which aim to guide regulatory behavior.122 On 
the surface, IOSCO lacks the force of either international or national law, 
and its enforcement power is largely toothless.123 However, IOSCO’s 
soft law can “harden” when countries incorporate the organization’s 
principles into statutes and binding domestic law.124 In fact, many sta-
tutes in the securities field are enacted in response to some current finan-
cial concerns, and because international organizations like IOSCO are 
generally thought to be more efficient and faster at responding to current 
socioeconomic events,125 domestic regulations are often drafted in the 
shadow of soft law.126 Therefore, IOSCO’s presence in the international 
securities industry has a significant effect on developing effective inter-
national regulatory measures, which are likely to be incorporated into 
binding domestic securities law. 
In the current global markets, securities regulations are no longer con-
sidered “domestic” due to the magnitude of financial globalization and 
innovation.127 As illustrated by the regulatory arbitrage phenomenon, 
regulatory principles implemented in one jurisdiction may have signifi-
cant consequences on the market participants in other jurisdictions.128 
This is the reason that international cooperation by national regulatory 
authorities is absolutely vital.129 Indeed, many authorities perceive soft 
law as the better medium through which market conditions are addressed 
faster and more effectively, both on an international scale and domesti-
cally.130 For example, in response to the 2007 market turmoil surround-
ing Credit Rating Agencies (“CRAs”), United States government offi-
                                                                                                                                     
 122. Id. at 894. 
 123. Id. at 885. 
 124. Id. at 884 (for example, the SEC incorporated IOSCO’s best practices into bind-
ing legal rules governing the US securities industry). 
 125. “[S]oft law is frequently more informed and more effective than statutory law. . . 
.” Id. at 885. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Charles McCreevy, European Commissioner, Internal Market and Services, Re-
marks at the Inaugural Global Financial Services Centre Conference: Regulating in a 
Global Market (June 16, 2008), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/08/33 [hereinafter 
McCreevy Speech]. 
 128. Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Speech at FEI 2008 Current Financial Report-
ing Issues Conference: Future of International Standards and Cooperation in Light of the 
Credit Crisis (Nov. 18 2008), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch111808cc.htm [hereinafter Cox Speech]. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Karmel & Kelly, supra note 105, at 890 (emphasizing that the alternative means, 
namely treaty and customary law enactments take much longer to develop and conclude, 
and do not provide the speed and efficiency needed for dynamic markets). 
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cials swiftly passed legislation granting authority to the SEC to exercise 
regulatory oversight of CRAs. The SEC turned to IOSCO for assistance 
in formulating standards of conduct applicable to CRAs.131 After the 
SEC implemented appropriate regulations, the Commission then pro-
ceeded with enforcement actions.132 
Although IOSCO’s Code of Conduct concerning the regulation of 
CRAs was welcomed by some, critics condemned the rules for not going 
far enough.133 It became clear to some industry experts that without mea-
ningful and consistent regulatory principles, the process of incorporating 
soft law into domestic legislation may lead to under-enforcement of the 
established regulations and a lack of efficient compliance mechanisms.134 
As a consequence, implementation of IOSCO’s soft law may “leave us 
without real rules that actually implement the policies that are 
needed.”135 Indeed, some industry experts believe that many of IOSCO’s 
recommendations set forth in the Short Selling Report do not provide 
meaningful and enforceable regulatory guidelines.136 
II. THE REGULATORY APPROACH TO SHORT SELLING — IOSCO’S FOUR 
PRINCIPLES 
In its Short Selling Report, IOSCO proposes four regulatory principles, 
which aim to eliminate “gaps in various regulatory approaches to naked 
short selling, including delivery requirements and disclosure of short po-
sitions.”137 The goal of IOSCO’s proposed principles is to develop a con-
sistent approach to short selling regulation in the international communi-
ty.138 The four principles are comprised of the following recommenda-
tions: 
Short selling should be subject to appropriate controls to reduce or mi-
nimize the potential risks that could affect the orderly and efficient 
functioning and stability of financial markets; 
Short selling should be subject to a reporting regime that provides time-
ly information to the market or market authorities; 
Short selling should be subject to an effective compliance and en-
forcement system; 
                                                                                                                                     
 131. Id. at 886–96. 
 132. Id. at 924–29. 
 133. Id. at 928. 
 134. Id. at 885–86, 896. 
 135. See id. at 932. 
 136. McCreevy Speech, supra note 127. 
 137. SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 8, at 4. 
 138. Id. 
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Short selling regulation should allow appropriate exceptions for certain 
types of transactions for efficient market functioning and develop-
ment.139 
IOSCO’s first three principles identify the significance of placing ap-
propriate controls on short selling activity, implementing consistent short 
position disclosure requirements, and ensuring appropriate compliance 
and enforcement procedures.140 The fourth principle recognizes that the 
practice of short selling has certain market benefits, if conducted in a 
regulated, nonabusive manner.141 This Note will briefly discuss the first, 
third and fourth principles of short selling regulation. It will then focus 
on IOSCO’s second principle, which suggests a short selling reporting 
regime that aims to provide timely information to the relevant entities. 
The Note will argue that IOSCO’s recommended approach to short posi-
tion disclosure and reporting requirements does not set forth consistent 
regulatory standards applicable on an international level. This Note will 
further suggest that allowing some markets to be more informed than 
others creates information asymmetry among jurisdictions and invites 
regulatory arbitrage. As a possible solution, this Note will offer CESR’s 
approach to formulating regulatory short position disclosure standards 
for all jurisdictions within the European Union. Finally, this Note will 
suggest that while CESR’s specific disclosure standards may not be op-
timal for all jurisdictions, its formulaic approach offers an effective me-
thod of implementing consistent regulatory standards that minimize po-
tential information asymmetry and regulatory arbitrage issues related to 
divergent regulatory regimes. 
A. An Overview of IOSCO’s First, Third, and Forth Principles of Short 
Selling Regulation 
In its first principle of short selling regulation, IOSCO recommends a 
minimum requirement of enforcing strict settlement of failed trades.142 
This can be achieved by compulsory buy-in (or close-out)143 require-
                                                                                                                                     
 139. SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 8, at 6. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See id. 
 142. Id. at 8. 
 143. Compulsory buy-in or close-out may be requested by the buyer who has not re-
ceived the stocks after a certain number of days. Alternatively, the process may be in-
itiated by the central counterparty of the securities settlement system. In addition, some 
markets impose monetary penalty on those who have failed to settle their trades within 
the standard settlement cycle. See SHORT SELLING REPORT supra note 8, at 10. 
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ments. IOSCO also proposes a shorter trade settlement cycle,144 where 
trades are settled no later than T+3 (i.e., three days after execution), to 
avoid the risk of settlement disruption.145 IOSCO’s recommendations in 
this area directly address one of its main concerns with respect to settle-
ment risk (one of the risks closely associated with naked short selling).146 
Moreover, IOSCO’s approach to regulating settlement disruption 
presents clear regulatory guidelines, which could be applied consistently, 
on an international level. 
IOSCO’s third principle of short selling regulation addresses the im-
plementation of international compliance and enforcement systems.147 
The basic tools for effective cross-border enforcement cooperation are 
set out in IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, and 
IOSCO Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consul-
tation and Cooperation and the Exchange of Information (MMOU).148 
This Note does not examine compliance and enforcement procedures as 
such assessment would draw upon extensive literature analyzing legal 
and regulatory systems, as well as the availability of resources dedicated 
to such endeavor. IOSCO’s fourth principle deals with exceptions for 
certain types of transactions and seems consistent, mutatis mutandis, 
with the approach taken by most regulatory authorities with developed 
capital markets.149 
B. The Need for Consistent Short Selling Information Disclosure Re-
quirements— IOSCO’s Second Principle of Short Selling Regulation 
In contrast with IOSCO’s clear standards for settlement discipline for-
mulated under the first principle of short selling regulation, the organiza-
tion fails to set forth similar guidelines with respect to short selling in-
formation disclosure obligations. Instead, the organization’s second prin-
ciple of short selling regulation confirms what is already known to the 
international community: that jurisdictions should “consider some form 
of reporting of short selling information either to the market or to market 
authorities.”150 However, IOSCO’s proposal does not offer the necessary 
                                                                                                                                     
 144. Settlement cycle is the “time lapse between trade execution to the settlement of 
trade.” Id. 
 145. See id. 
 146. Strict settlement rules have the potential to discourage and deter abusive short 
selling behavior (i.e., “those who short sold with no intention of . . . delivery”). See 
SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 8. 
 147. Id. at 17–20. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 8. 
 150. Id. at 11–15 (emphasis added). 
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regulatory clarity and consistency with respect to disclosure requirements 
to the companies and market participants that operate on an international 
level.151 
Many market authorities have recognized that the globalization of the 
securities markets has created a need for the sharing of information 
among regulators and market participants.152 In jurisdictions with devel-
oped capital markets, some regulators, such as the SEC, aim to regulate 
the markets by promoting the disclosure of relevant trading information 
rather than directly intervening in the functioning of a free market econ-
omy.153 The theory supporting this regulatory approach is that by ensur-
ing that investors possess relevant information, mandatory disclosure 
“leverages market discipline as a means of accountability that stands in 
contrast to more substantive government oversight.”154 For example, the 
inclusion of risk factors in issuer’s prospectuses reflects the SEC’s long-
held view that all investors should have access to a “common pool of 
knowledge” in order to judge for themselves whether to buy, to sell, or to 
hold a particular security.155 It follows that the role of the regulators in 
this type of a regime is to create high quality, disclosure-based regula-
tions that will supply the market with the optimal amount of information 
necessary for the market participants to make sound investment deci-
sions. As such, IOSCO’s second principle, merits further consideration, 
namely with respect to the purpose of short position disclosure and re-
porting obligations. 
In the securities markets, the price of a security ideally reflects all pub-
licly-available information about the issuer, as well as other economic 
                                                                                                                                     
 151. See id. 
 152. Karmel & Kelly, supra note 105, at 914. 
 153. Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Opening Remarks at SEC Roundtable on Mod-
ernizing the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Disclosure System (Oct. 8, 2008), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch100808cc.htm (explaining that 
since its foundation, the SEC’s purpose has been to maintain investor confidence in the 
markets by providing them with reliable information). 
 154. Troy A. Paredes, Commissioner, SEC, Remarks before the Symposium on “The 
Past, Present and Future of the SEC” (Oct. 16, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch101609tap.htm (explaining that collective 
judgment of the informed marketplace should be respected as a worthy alternative to 
more substantive government control of private sector conduct) [hereinafter Paredes 
Speech]. 
 155. The SEC believes that “[o]nly through the steady flow of timely, comprehensive, 
and accurate information can people make sound investment decisions. The result of this 
information flow is a far more active, efficient, and transparent capital market that facili-
tates the capital formation so important to our nation’s economy.” The Investor’s Advo-
cate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital 
Formation, http://sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Jan. 29, 2010). 
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conditions. For financial markets to function, the information driving the 
trading of the securities should be reliable and transparent.156 Thus, dis-
closure requirements are necessary to achieve transparency in the market 
and place market participants in a position to effectively evaluate in-
vestment opportunities.157 
While public knowledge of short selling differs among jurisdictions, 
markets where short position disclosure requirements are implemented 
tend to be better informed than those where there are no such require-
ments.158 This is in part because short position disclosures may enhance 
the availability of information related to the issuers and the price of their 
securities. Specifically, short sellers, by betting on a company’s stock 
price decline, signal to the market their view of the company’s pros-
pects.159 In this manner, greater disclosure about short selling activities 
may provide more information to the market about an issuer, which in 
turn may enhance price discovery. A better-informed market makes it 
more difficult for market manipulators to spread false rumors in order to 
manipulate the price of a security.160 In this sense, regulatory disclosures 
operate as a necessary means to ensure investor protection.161 Therefore, 
appropriate levels of short selling disclosure may supply investors with 
relevant information, enhance market efficiency and potentially deter 
market abuse.162 It is important to note that reporting of short positions 
should be timely to prevent information from becoming stale before it 
reaches the market.163 
While disclosure of information is generally considered to be an effec-
tive means of achieving market efficiency and investor protection, not all 
information is valuable, and information may be subject to misinterpreta-
tion.164 Information overload (i.e., when too much information is released 
into the market) impairs the ability of a market participant to distinguish 
what is important in making his or her investment decisions and fru-
strates the purpose of the disclosure.165 Moreover, the information ob-
                                                                                                                                     
 156. Indeed, some regulatory authorities consider that insufficient transparency was at 
the heart of the 2008 financial crisis. Cox Speech, supra note128. 
 157. Paredes Speech, supra note 154. 
 158. TRANSPARENCY REPORT, supra note 35. 
 159. In this manner, short sellers contribute to assessing the true value of a company’s 
stock. Id. 
 160. Sheehan, supra note 6, at 9. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 8, at 14. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Paredes Speech, supra note 154 (explaining that when information is not 
processed and interpreted effectively, disclosure does not translate into better decision-
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tained from a short sale may be ambiguous and open to various interpre-
tations.166 A short sale itself may not provide enough information to the 
market about the short seller’s motive. For example, from the short itself 
it may be unclear whether the short seller sold the security short in order 
to express a negative view about the issuer or simply hedge167 another 
position. 
Mandatory disclosure also imposes substantial compliance costs on 
market participants.168 Such costs are normally related to the implemen-
tation of disclosure mechanisms and compliance costs incurred by the 
constituents subject to the regulatory disclosure regime. An additional 
cost of information disclosure may be incurred by the market where pub-
lic disclosure of short positions could compromise proprietary trading 
strategies169 and discourage hedging activity.170 Because industry experts 
recognize non-manipulative short selling strategies, including hedging, 
as socially valuable, markets may actually become less transparent and 
consequently, less informed when stringent disclosure obligations result 
in overall less short selling.171 Empirical studies further suggest that high 
quality disclosures reduce the incentives for market participants to search 
for information.172 In other words, full transparency in the market will 
give the investors less incentive to gather new information because they 
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would not be compensated for the resources they expend.173 Therefore, 
many regulatory authorities recognize the importance of providing the 
market with valuable information, while attempting to maintain the in-
centives for market participants to search for new information.174 
In sum, when establishing disclosure and reporting regimes, regulators 
should be clear about the objectives of such regulations.175 The above-
mentioned evidence concerning the effects of short position disclosure 
on the markets indicates that the most optimal regulations would ensure 
that investors receive socially-valuable information resulting from short 
selling activity and protect proprietary interests in gathering new infor-
mation. Therefore, it is important to identify specific disclosure require-
ments that will allow for the most beneficial flow of information to the 
public markets. IOSCO’s second principle of short selling regulation 
identifies various disclosure methods implemented by different jurisdic-
tions but does not advance a solution that would unify current short posi-
tion disclosure regimes. 
C. IOSCO’s Disclosure Approach Poses the Risks of Information Asym-
metry and Regulatory Arbitrage 
As discussed earlier, the primary motivation for legislative measures 
with respect to short selling is to ensure more effective reporting of short 
selling information.176 In order to achieve this result, domestic regulators 
have implemented largely divergent approaches to setting short selling 
disclosure obligations for market participants.177 IOSCO’s second prin-
ciple of short selling regulation addresses international discrepancies in 
reporting requirements by identifying two different methods of disclo-
sure: (1) flagging of short sales178 and (2) short positions reporting.179 
While IOSCO recognizes that “both models have their own merits,” it 
neither endorses a specific measure, nor proposes a consistent regulatory 
standard for short position disclosure requirements.180 This approach 
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SELLING DISCLOSURE REGIME, CESR/10-088 (Mar. 2010); Short Selling Report, supra 
note 8, at 16. 
 180. SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 8, at 12. 
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sends a mixed message to the international securities industry and does 
not resolve the issue of regulatory dissonance in the area. 
Although the flagging method is used by some countries such as Cana-
da and Greece, IOSCO and CESR have identified certain flaws with 
mandating uniform flagging requirements.181 This method requires a 
marker to be placed on each individual short sale order that a broker 
sends to a regulated market or alternative trading venue for execution.182 
The market then reads the order as a short sale, rather than just a sale of a 
security.183 One issue with this approach is that while flagging short sales 
provides regulators with real-time data encompassing intra-day activities, 
the process of its aggregation raises issues of information redundancy 
(e.g., a large part of this information is already captured in the form of 
stock lending data).184 The concern is that the costs incurred through ag-
gregating and disclosing already-available information may outweigh 
any potential benefit of releasing such information into the market.185 In 
addition, the market may encounter information overload, as supplying it 
with duplicative information will likely confuse, rather than help market 
participants.186 
The flagging approach also presents a lack of clarity with respect to the 
actual outstanding short positions, such that regulators would not be able 
to readily identify large short positions or aggressive short selling.187 
Marking an order as a short sale does not necessarily offer specific in-
sight into whether the short seller is expressing a negative view about the 
issuer or simply hedging his position.188 Therefore, market authorities 
would not receive enough information via flagging to determine whether 
a market participant is aggressively short selling the issuer’s stock to 
manipulate the price of the stock, to express concerns about the issuer’s 
financial health, or to simply hedge other positions.189 In addition, be-
                                                                                                                                     
 181. See Press Release, CESR, CESR to Consult on Pan-European Short Selling Dis-
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cause only a few jurisdictions implement this approach, achieving un-
iformity via flagging would be extremely cumbersome on market partic-
ipants.190 Regulated entities and/or stock exchanges that are currently 
subject to disclosure-based regimes would be required to contribute or 
divert considerable resources to operational and compliance measures in 
order to implement the system.191 In sum, while IOSCO does not take a 
definitive position on flagging as a disclosure mechanism, the SEC, FSA 
and CESR all favor short position reporting instead of the flagging ap-
proach, as way to disclose short sales to the market.192 
Short position disclosure necessarily requires a system of reporting 
short selling information either to the market or market authorities.193 In 
developing a system of reporting, regulators must balance the utility of 
information disclosure to the market against the costs of providing such 
information.194 Among other things, short position reporting raises con-
cerns with respect to the appropriate trigger level of reporting, whether 
the focus should be on net or gross short position reporting, the timing of 
reporting, the types of securities reportable, and whether the short posi-
tion details should be confidentially disclosed to the regulators or public-
ly disclosed to the market.195 The notification of short positions exceed-
ing a de minimis level deals with the trigger level of short positions re-
porting.196 For example, some markets require reporting of existing short 
positions once the positions exceed 0.25% of the issued share capital of 
the relevant stocks.197 The Short Selling Report suggests that the trigger 
level of reporting should not be set so high as to prevent the flow of use-
ful information.198 On the other hand, setting the threshold too low may 
be overly burdensome on those responsible for reporting.199 Essentially, 
IOSCO leaves the issue of determining the trigger level at the discretion 
of national regulators.200 
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The decision regarding whether short position reporting should be im-
plemented on a gross or net basis means determining whether to report 
current overall short sales of an issuer (gross basis) or current overall 
exposure to an issuer (net basis).201 The benefit of net position reporting 
is that it takes into account long positions in the stock, which may cancel 
out the short positions.202 For example, if the holder of a disclosed gross 
short position also has a similar-sized long position in the issuer, the po-
sitions cancel out and the holder is in fact “flat.” Gross position reporting 
does not take this into account and only shows the holder’s total short 
exposure to the issuer.203 Thus, net position reporting may be more useful 
than gross position reporting because it provides more accurate informa-
tion about the total current short interest in the security.204 
In order to be effective, IOSCO suggests that short position reporting 
should be timely.205 The time lag between the creation of positions and 
their reporting may render the information stale.206 The timeliness of 
available information raises the issue of whether short position informa-
tion should be reported confidentially to the market authorities or public-
ly disclosed to the market. Public disclosure of significant individual 
short positions may have harmful commercial effects mentioned earlier, 
such as the disclosure of a proprietary trading strategy.207 In addition, 
public disclosure may make those holding large short positions in an is-
suer subject to a “short squeeze.”208 In this situation, when the demand 
for stock exceeds its supply, the rapid increase in the price of the stock 
may force short sellers to purchase the stock at a substantially higher 
price in order to cover their short positions, thus incurring large econom-
ic losses from the transaction.209 
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While public disclosure of short positions poses commercial concerns, 
confidential disclosure to a regulator may be less efficient due to the time 
lag created by reporting the information to market authorities before dis-
closing it publically.210 As the time lag increases, the potential benefits 
derived from disclosures in terms of informed decision-making de-
crease.211 Still, disclosure to regulatory authorities may be helpful in 
identifying any unusual short selling activities potentially giving rise to 
market abuse.212 Once notified of potentially troublesome transactions, a 
regulator would then be able to determine whether intervention is re-
quired.213 
While addressing each of the above considerations, IOSCO fails to ar-
rive at an internationally consistent approach or set a minimum threshold 
of short position reporting, instead leaving the ultimate decision with 
domestic regulators.214 The organization’s second principle of short sell-
ing regulation also does not take into consideration every asset class in 
which a seller may express short interest.215 For example, securities that 
trade as common stock in the local market are also available to trade in 
foreign markets as depository receipts.216 When trading in the same secu-
rity is fragmented among different markets, arbitrageurs stand ready to 
take advantage of any gap that develops in the price of the security. As 
discussed earlier, because the price of a security ideally reflects all rele-
vant information pertaining to the issuer, any information asymmetries 
resulting from different regulatory regimes may in fact create an arbi-
trage opportunity.217 This is because information asymmetry could poten-
tially affect the pricing of securities that trade on numerous national 
markets.218 In other words, if the regulatory regime in one jurisdiction 
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institutes less rigorous (or ineffective) short selling disclosure require-
ments, the price of a security trading in that jurisdiction will reflect less 
information about the issuer. Consequently, the same security trading in 
a different jurisdiction with more rigorous disclosure requirements will 
have a different price because it will likely reflect more information. The 
market which is dominant in the provision of information would also be 
dominant in the pricing of the securities traded on that market.219 In this 
manner, information asymmetry stemming from different regulatory re-
gimes may contribute to the difference in the prices of same security 
trading in different jurisdictions. The subsequent price difference of the 
same security may create a riskless profit opportunity and further contri-
bute to regulatory arbitrage.220 
Another potential effect of regulatory arbitrage stemming from differ-
ent short position disclosure requirements is the frustration of purpose or 
values advanced by the domestic regulatory regime. To illustrate, if a 
market participant wishes to short sell a stock that is exchange-listed in a 
jurisdiction that requires full position disclosure, he or she may be in-
clined to circumvent more stringent disclosure regulations by short sell-
ing the depository receipts, which are trading in a jurisdiction with less 
aggressive disclosure requirements.221 This is problematic when two ju-
risdictions have strong but opposite opinions as to what level of disclo-
sure is best.222 The jurisdiction which adheres to stringent disclosure 
principles will find that its regulations are undermined when investors 
choose to short sell depository receipts, which trade in a jurisdiction with 
less stringent disclosure requirements. IOSCO’s principles do not ad-
dress this regulatory concern. 
IOSCO’s Short Selling Report repeatedly concedes that the regulation 
of short selling activities varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, depend-
ing on a range of domestic factors, including, but not limited to, market 
conditions and domestic regulatory landscape.223 Responding to these 
concerns, “international standards usually grant a fair amount of discre-
tion to national regulators.”224 However, IOSCO grants national regula-
tors virtually unlimited discretion in implementing short sale reporting 
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obligations.225 The organization’s failure to resolve regulatory dissonance 
leaves national regulators with no other source for arriving at consistent 
international standards of short selling regulation in times of greatest 
economic need.226 Discretion is by definition nontransparent, and the fact 
that IOSCO’s national regulators develop standards that grant those same 
regulators virtually unlimited discretion is troubling,227 as this ultimately 
leaves securities regulation in the hands of national regulators who are 
not required to arrive at consistent international standards.228 Therefore, 
while some discretion should be afforded to national regulators in order 
to fine-tune IOSCO’s principles of securities regulation to be more in 
line with domestic needs, unlimited discretion could leave the markets 
without any internationally consistent regulatory principles. The organi-
zation’s Short Selling Report fails to address the concern shared by many 
regulators that information asymmetries between informed short sellers 
and uninformed market participants could result in price variations.229 
Once price variations occur, the gateway is opened for regulatory arbi-
trage, where market manipulators are free to take advantage of less-
informed markets. 
III. CESR’S SHORT POSITION DISCLOSURE APPROACH 
There are a number of different approaches to implementing interna-
tionally consistent short position disclosure regulations. 230 For example, 
the SEC, permits confidential short position disclosures to regulatory 
authorities, while Self-Regulatory Organizations publish daily short sell-
ing volume and individual short sale transactions.231 The FSA, on the 
other hand, considers public disclosure of relevant short sale positions to 
be the key in improving transparency and market efficiency.232 One poss-
ible solution that attempts to reconcile conflicting disclosure standards is 
CESR’s two-tiered system of disclosure.233 
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CESR’s first level of disclosure is the private short position disclosure 
to a national regulator when that position reaches a specified initial thre-
shold (CESR proposes to set this threshold at 0.1% of the company’s 
issued share capital).234 This technique provides the regulators with early 
warning signs of large short position accumulations, thereby alerting 
them to potentially abusive behavior and allowing them to monitor and 
take action more effectively.235 If the short position reaches a second-tier 
threshold (proposed at 0.5%), the holder of the position would be re-
quired to publicly disclose the position to the market.236 Disclosure cal-
culations and reports would be made on a net basis237 and reported on the 
day following the day on which the relevant trigger threshold was 
crossed.238 CESR also makes room for exemptions from disclosure obli-
gations for short positions resulting from market making activities.239 
IV. CONCLUSION 
While CESR’s approach is subject to some criticism,240 its objectives 
are not unlike those of IOSCO, in that CESR aims at harmonizing the 
disclosure regime for short selling within the European Union.241 As 
such, CESR illustrates that it is possible to implement clear, meaningful 
standards with respect to short selling regulation and disclosure require-
ments. While this Note does not advocate CESR’s specific approach as 
the best-fitting international regulatory measure for short position disclo-
sure, CESR’s approach illustrates a compromise among the European 
Union’s national regulators and an implementation of functional and 
specific regulatory standards. 
IOSCO is an “international association of securities regulators with 
tremendous influence on the development of international norms for the 
regulation of securities.”242 In times of economic crises, international 
legislative bodies tend to look to IOSCO for advice on appropriate regu-
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latory measures and to “bring a consensus to the complex and divergent 
regimes that exist globally.”243 To wit, it is the only organization with the 
power to develop internationally consistent standards of short selling 
regulation through its consultation papers and reports.244 
Without clear and consistent guidelines, regulatory dissonance in dis-
closure obligations breeds information asymmetry among jurisdictions, 
which erodes market efficiency. The differences in regulatory short posi-
tion disclosure regimes may also invite unwanted regulatory arbitrage. 
Many industry experts believe that the securities industry requires a uni-
form approach to short selling regulation, which can operate on a cross-
border basis.245 This type of a regime could eradicate the negative effects 
of information asymmetry and regulatory arbitrage. These experts also 
propose that achieving internationally consistent standards of regulation 
could significantly improve investor confidence and reduce systemic risk 
in global capital markets.246 Considering the risks that information 
asymmetry and regulatory arbitrage may pose to the international securi-
ties industry, the organization’s short position disclosure and reporting 
principles should embody the best-fitting rules, which provide the inter-
national securities industry with clarity and consistency in the area of 
short selling regulation. 
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